Mrs. Parmelia Davis had suffered from epilepsy for many years. In 1905 her husband, Mr. Davis, arranged for Mrs. Davis to see Dr. Pratt, who was then considered an authority on epilepsy. Based on the prevailing medical view that in women there is a relationship between epilepsy and the uterus, Dr. Pratt told Mrs. Davis that he would have to operate on her womb.

Mrs. Davis underwent a first surgery, in which Dr. Pratt repaired some lacerations of the uterine cervix. She was asked to return to the hospital one or two weeks later for further treatment of a minor irritation. Upon her second visit, Mrs. Davis was anesthetized while Dr. Pratt surgically removed her uterus and ovaries.

Later, in court, Dr. Pratt stated that he ”did not deem [Mrs. Davis] worthy [of any explanation],” and that he had ”calmly deceived the woman” (Katz 1984, p. 50). Through his attorney, Dr. Pratt advanced that by placing herself in his care for treatment without explicit limitations of his authority, Mrs. Davis had consented to ”that he may perform such operation as in his best judgment is proper and essential to her welfare” (ibid., pp. 50–1).

Med dessa ord inleder jag min licentiatavhandling i medicinsk etik. Frågorna i min forskning rör vad det innebär att samtycka till eller avstå från en vårdinsats. Jag är som mest intresserad av autonomibegreppet och hur det gäller i samtyckessituationer. Ladda gärna hem avhandlingen här.

Jag har vid flera tillfällen presenterat min forskning vid det högre seminariet på Avdelningen för filosofi på KTH, Institutionen för Lärande, informatik, management och etik på Karolinska Institutet och för forskningsprogrammet Ethical aspects on person-centred care.

Under våren 2016 var jag delarrangör för en akademisk workshop om libertarianism inom politisk filosofi. På den gav jag presentationen Problems of Libertarian Self-Ownership, vilken blev väl mottagen.


Doktorand i filosofi som bloggar för att bejaka skrivlusten. Läs mer här.

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